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INTRODUCTION
Since the nineteenth century, adoption has been used in the United
States to create legally recognized parent–child relationships between
consenting adults.1 While adult adoption has grown in prevalence in the
United States,2 some Americans are either unaware of its availability or
*

J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; B.A., Emory University, 2006. I would like
to thank the members of the Northwestern University Law Review Board for their helpful comments and
suggestions throughout the writing process. Thank you also to my advisor, Professor Helene Shapo, for
her guidance and insight in the early stages of this Comment. Finally, a special thanks to my friends and
family for their love and support.
1
See, e.g., In re Wright’s Estate, 155 Pa. 64, 65 (1893) (referencing a provision of the Act of May
9, 1889, which “authorized the adoption of adults, as children and heirs, with the consent and approval
of the persons so adopted and of the proper court”).
2
See Terry L. Turnipseed, Scalia’s Ship of Revulsion Has Sailed: Will Lawrence Protect Adults
Who Adopt Lovers To Help Ensure Their Inheritance from Incest Prosecution?, 32 HAMLINE L. REV.
95, 95 (2009) (recognizing the “growing trend” of adult adoption in the United States).
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underestimate its use in our legal system. In reality, there are several
reasons why an adult would choose to adopt another adult, and the practice
is not at all uncommon.3
This Comment explores adult adoption and the corresponding rights
afforded to adult adoptees under the intestate succession and class gift
provisions of the Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”).4 The Comment assesses
the advantages and disadvantages of adopting the UPC’s suggested
provisions and proposes a modification to the UPC that treats adult
adoptees consistently in both the class gift and intestacy contexts: as natural
children for transfers directly from adoptive parents but not for transfers
from third parties. As discussed below, such a statutory framework is both
consistent with the principles of estate law and is sound public policy.
The motivations behind an adult adoption are often numerous and
include the recognition of familial ties, enjoyment of employment benefits,
and establishment of inheritance rights.5 For these reasons, adult adoption
has been used by same-sex couples to obtain some of the rights denied to
them by the unavailability of marriage.6 This Comment seeks a happy
medium that ensures the protection of the important benefits that lie outside
of the inheritance realm, while avoiding the potential manipulation of estate
law. It concludes that adult adoption petitions should be broadly granted,
with legislatures resolving intestacy and class gift issues through clear and
comprehensive inheritance statutes.
Part II of this Comment explores the history and rationale behind adult
adoption and assesses its statutory availability across states. Part III
explains the treatment of adult adoptees under UPC sections 2-155 and
2-705 and determines that while the UPC provision on class gifts is
consistent with decedent intent and social policy, the intestacy provision
falls short.
Part IV proposes a statutory scheme that adopts the UPC class gift
provision, but modifies the UPC intestacy section to limit inheritance by an
adult adoptee through an adoptive parent to those situations where a parent–
child relationship exists. Part IV also suggests a reciprocal beneficiary
program as a way for states to allow parties to preserve inheritance rights
without resorting to adult adoption.
3

Unfortunately no data are available regarding the number of adult adoption petitions in each state.
However, adult adoption has been acknowledged as enjoying “widespread recognition within our legal
system,” and “not an uncommon occurrence.” Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and
Association: Who Should Get What and Why (The Impact of Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and Equitable
Adoptions on Intestate Succession and Class Gifts), 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 749 (1984). One now-dated
estimate by “knowledgeable practitioners” put the number of successful adult adoption petitions in
California at around two to three hundred per year. See Peter N. Fowler, Comment, Adult Adoption: A
“New” Legal Tool for Lesbians and Gay Men, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 667, 702 (1984).
4
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-115, 2-705 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 50–51, 141–42 (Supp. 2011).
5
See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 3, at 679–88.
6
See, e.g., id.
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I.

BACKGROUND

A. History of Adoption
Historically, adoption’s primary uses were to perpetuate familial
lineage and designate heirs to fulfill religious obligations.7 The intended
beneficiary of the adoption was the adopter rather than the adoptee.8 When
adoption first emerged in the United States, it was an informal process used
to relieve the government of a ward and provide an economic benefit to the
adoptive parents.9 The state of the adoptive home was not a consideration,
and the children were often used as cheap labor.10 It was not until the
nineteenth century that the primary concern in minor adoptions shifted from
the adopter’s potential benefits to the best interests of the child.11
Adoption did not exist under English common law and its formal
acceptance and regulation in the United States has been exclusively by
statute.12 In the mid-nineteenth century, general adoption legislation was
introduced as part of the growing call for social welfare reform.13 While
some of the enacted statutes provided for the adoption of “children,”14
several state legislatures also enacted separate provisions for the adoption of
adults.15 At the same time, the broad and ambiguous language of the
general adoption provisions in other states was interpreted to extend to
adoptees of any age.16

7

Rein, supra note 3, at 714.
See Walter Wadlington, Adoption of Adults: A Family Law Anomaly, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 566,
567 (1969).
9
See Rein, supra note 3, at 714–15.
10
See Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958–1983, 17 FAM. L.Q. 173,
176 (1983).
11
See Rein, supra note 3, at 716–17.
12
Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 747 (1956);
Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443,
443 (1971).
13
Rein, supra note 3, at 716–17. The increase in immigration and rise in poverty associated with
the industrial revolution caused a corresponding rise in the number of destitute children, which
highlighted the inadequacies of the limited and informal adoption process in existence. Housing the
children that were displaced became a focus of Christian philanthropy and led to our current adoption
system. Id.
14
Wadlington, supra note 8, at 569. Massachusetts is believed to be the first state to ratify an
adoption statute, in 1851. Id. The Act provided for the adoption of “children,” which was interpreted to
limit its application to minors only. Id.
15
Id. Within twenty years of enacting its general adoption provision, Massachusetts enacted a
specific provision for adult adoption that stated: “A person of adult age may be adopted in like manner
upon his own consent, without other consent or notice.” 1871 Mass. Acts 654. Vermont also endorsed
adult adoption as early as 1853. See 1853 Vt. Acts & Resolves 42–43.
16
See Note, Adult Adoption, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 253, 255 (1972).
8
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B. Why Adopt an Adult?
While adult adoption gained recognition at around the same time as
minor adoption, the rationales for its use were (and remain) largely
different. Similar to minor adoption, adult adoption is implemented to
formalize a family unit.17 This is often the motivation behind the adoption
of foster and stepchildren who were raised by the adoptive parent and
developed a parent–child bond but had not yet legally solidified that
relationship.18 The parties may fail to undertake an adoption when the
adoptee is a minor because of legal obstacles,19 or an earlier adoption may
be invalidated because of a procedural defect.20 After reaching adulthood,
the child may also want to carry on the family name or give recognition to
her de facto parent.21
Additionally, adult adoption is sometimes used in an attempt to
circumvent various laws and regulations or to ensure the extension of
benefits to the adoptee.22 One illustrative example is Coker v. Celebrezze,
in which a grandparent adopted his twenty-three-year-old disabled
grandchild in order to secure insurance and disability benefits under the
Social Security Act.23 Similarly, in 333 E. 53rd Street Associates v. Mann,
two elderly roommates used adult adoption to circumvent state eviction
laws.24
17

See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 3, at 686–88.
See, e.g., St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 76 S.W.2d 685, 686, 689 (Mo. 1934) (upholding the
adoption of Hill’s two stepchildren, ages twenty-two and twenty-eight).
19
This issue often arises when the biological parent refuses to consent to the adoption. See, e.g., In
re Estate of Joseph, 949 P.2d 472, 480–81 (Cal. 1998) (explaining that the natural parents’ refusal to
consent was a legal barrier to adoption by the foster parent while the child was a minor, but the
impediment was lifted when the child reached the age of maturity).
20
Several states have annulment statutes that provides for the revocation of a final adoption decree
within a specified time period if the decree is procedurally defective. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-123 (2011) (allowing one year for procedural attacks on adoption decrees); COLO. REV. STAT. § 195-214 (2010) (allowing ninety days for procedural attacks on final decrees, extended to one year for
stepparent adoptions); D.C. CODE § 16-310 (2011) (allowing one year for procedural attacks on
adoption decrees); see also Note, When Love Is Not Enough: Toward a Unified Wrongful Adoption Tort,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1761, 1766–67 (1992).
21
See In re Adoption of Miller, 227 So. 2d 73, 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (stating that the
adoptee wanted to be legally recognized as the adopters’ son because he felt the adopters were his only
real family, he had used their surname since high school, and they felt a mutual affection as members of
a family unit).
22
See, e.g., Wadlington, supra note 8, at 577.
23
241 F. Supp. 783, 783–85 (E.D. Tenn. 1965). The Social Security Act required that the
beneficiary be the wage earner’s child, adopted child, or stepchild. Id. at 784. Though the adoption
itself was approved, the claim for benefits was denied by the government on the ground that Tennessee
law did not allow for the adoption of an individual over the age of twenty-one. Id. The District Court,
however, disagreed with the government and reinstated the benefits on the grounds of legislative intent.
Id. at 786–87.
24
503 N.Y.S.2d 752, 753 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). Jerri Blanchard, the adopter, was a rentcontrolled tenant in an apartment building that was subsequently converted to cooperative ownership.
18
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Increasingly, however, adult adoption is prompted by inheritance
objectives.25 On questions of inheritance, the law generally treats adopted
children in the same manner as natural children.26 A growing number of
people take advantage of this principle of estate law through adult adoption,
which brings the adoptee into the purview of intestate succession and may
even qualify him as a class gift beneficiary.27
In all fifty states, if an individual dies intestate (i.e., without a legal
will) and is survived only by an adopted child, the adopted child becomes
the sole inheritor of the individual’s estate.28 This severs the inheritance
rights of all other biological relatives, such as the decedent’s siblings and
parents.29 Additionally, by becoming the adoptive parent’s heir, the adoptee
may be entitled to inherit through the adopter via intestate succession.30 For
example, if the adopter dies before a relative from whom he would inherit,
and the relative then dies intestate, the adoptee could inherit his adoptive
parent’s share by representation.
This issue was addressed in Harper v. Martin.31 In Harper, a
terminally ill petitioner adopted a forty-seven-year-old male for the sole
purpose of qualifying him as an heir to her incompetent relative who lacked
a will.32 The trial court held that the adoptee did not constitute an heir on
the ground that the relative was too incompetent to make a will and
therefore did not have the opportunity to disinherit him.33 The appellate
court reversed, however, finding that the relative did not have any plan for
Id. Helen Mann, the adoptee, was Blanchard’s roommate who lived with Blanchard since before the
conversion. Id. In order to secure Mann’s tenancy after Blanchard died, Blanchard legally adopted
Mann so that she fell within the New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations. Id. at 753–54 (“No
occupant of housing accommodations shall be evicted under this section where the occupant is either the
surviving spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased tenant’s family who has
been living with the tenant.” (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2104.6(d))).
25
See, e.g., In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Del. 1993) (“Cases upholding
adoptions for the purpose of improving the adoptee’s inheritance rights continue to grow.”).
26
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5 cmt. d
(1999); 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 175 (2011); Brynne E. McCabe, Note, Adult Adoption: The Varying
Motives, Potential Consequences, and Ethical Considerations, 22 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 300, 301
(2009).
27
See Rein, supra note 3, 749–51.
28
See generally Turnipseed, supra note 2, at 99–106 (providing background information on
intestate succession in the United States).
29
See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 225,
253 (1981).
30
See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 101 (8th ed. 2009). To
inherit “through” someone means to acquire the right to inherit that the person would have had if he
were living or able to inherit. This is different than inheriting “from” someone, which entitles an
individual to a portion of the person’s estate, but does not allow the individual to continue to inherit
from other estates on that person’s behalf.
31
552 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
32
Id. at 692.
33
Id.
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disposition that would be “thwarted” by recognizing the adoptee’s
inheritance rights.34
In cases where an adoptive parent dies with a will, the recognition of
the adoptee as the adoptive parent’s descendant ensures that natural parents
and collateral relatives35 are barred from challenging the will’s legality.36
The only individuals with standing to contest a will are those who stand to
inherit if the will is invalidated.37 By removing their ability to take by
intestacy, the adoption revokes the standing of other relatives to challenge
the will’s validity.38 A notorious example is Greene v. Fitzpatrick, in which
a wealthy, unmarried attorney adopted his married mistress in order to
secure her inheritance rights and prevent any challenge by his biological
relatives.39 Justice Holmes acknowledged this effect of adoption, noting
that adoption for the purpose of “tak[ing] away any inducement that some
of those who otherwise would have been his heirs might have to oppose his
will” was “perfectly proper.”40
More controversial than intestate succession is the use of adult
adoption to include the adoptee within class gifts in will and trust
dispositions.41 In designating beneficiaries, a testator or settler of a trust
may provide for distribution to such classes as “children,” “issue,” or
“descendants.”42 Generally, the language used in defining the class43 and

34

Id.
In the context of estate law, collaterals are relatives outside of the direct line of ascent or descent.
Collaterals include such relatives as siblings, cousins, aunts, and uncles. See, e.g., ROGER W.
ANDERSEN & IRA MARK BLOOM, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES 43 (3d ed. 2007).
36
See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 30, at 102–03.
37
See, e.g., id.
38
See id. This is not to say that blood relatives are denied all methods of attack. They may still be
able to challenge the actual adoption decree on grounds of mental incapacity or undue influence. See,
e.g., Wilson v. Caulfield, 67 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934) (allowing a challenge to adoption on
fraud and undue influence grounds). If the adoption is set aside, the relatives regain standing to
challenge the will because their intestacy rights are reinstated. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note
30, at 102–03. However, the adoption still offers an additional line of defense against the invalidation of
the will and provides a strong indication of testamentary intent. See id. at 103.
39
295 S.W. 896, 897 (Ky. 1927). It is important to note, however, that the court did allow the
relatives to challenge the actual adoption, as opposed to the will, on fraud and undue influence grounds.
See id. at 899; see also Wilson, 67 S.W.2d at 764 (providing an example of an adoption being challenged
on fraud and undue influence grounds).
40
Collamore v. Learned, 50 N.E. 518, 519 (Mass. 1898).
41
See Rein, supra note 3, at 755 (raising the argument that in class gift situations, as opposed to
intestate succession, it is more likely that the adoption will have occurred long after the donor’s death,
making manipulation more plausible).
42
See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 30, at 103.
43
See Note, supra note 16, at 265–66 (noting that some courts have held such designations as
“issue” and “heirs of the body” to require blood relationships and “children” to exclude adults, but have
interpreted “heirs” more broadly).
35
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the statutes in effect at the time of execution44 are considered as factors
when determining whether the adult adoptee falls within the beneficiary
class.45 Several courts have interpreted adult adoptees to fall within these
classes in the same manner as minor adoptees.46 The designations of “heirs”
and “heirs at law” in particular have been subject to a technical
interpretation that does away with the requirement of a blood relationship
and includes both minor and adult adoptees.47
In In re Estate of Fortney,48 the court took such a broad approach in
interpreting a class gift. John Fortney’s parents, the testators, formulated
their will so that all of their property would go to John and his sister, and
then to their children.49 If John and his sister died without heirs, the
remainder would go to the testators’ siblings’ children.50 After John’s sister
passed away without any children, John, who was ninety years old and
childless, adopted his wife’s sixty-five-year-old nephew.51 Over the
objection of John’s cousins, the court held that the property transferred to
the adult adoptee at John’s death.52 Looking to the Kentucky probate code,
the court held that “an adopted adult falls within the definition of ‘child’ as
contemplated by that statute.”53 Though the original will was executed
sixteen years before adult adoption even became legal in Kansas, the court
reasoned that the testator must be presumed “to know the legislature might
change both the age of majority and the limitation that only minors could be
adopted.”54
If an adult adoptee qualifies for inclusion in such a class, the associated
rights go beyond even those inheritance rights provided by marriage.55
Such a result has not gone unnoticed by savvy estate planners. In Bedinger
v. Graybill’s Executor & Trustee, the Kentucky Court of Appeals (then the

44

See Abramovic v. Brunken, 94 Cal. Rptr. 303, 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (denying inclusion of
adult adoptee as “issue” on grounds that at the time of execution, issue was defined as a blood relation
and adult adoption had not been legalized); First Nat’l Bank of Kan. City v. Sullivan, 394 S.W.2d 273,
281 (Mo. 1965) (“[The court’s interpretation] is in accordance with the general rule that whether an
adopted child is embraced within the meaning of a described class of beneficiaries in a will is governed
by the law in force at the time the will or other instrument was executed.”).
45
Note, supra note 16, at 264.
46
See id. at 264–65.
47
See id. at 263–65; see also Brock v. Dorman, 98 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Mo. 1936) (allowing inclusion
of adult adoptee in a class gift to “heirs,” and noting that the term “heir” is “broader and more inclusive”
than “children” or “heirs of the body”).
48
611 P.2d 599 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980).
49
Id. at 601.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 600–01.
52
Id. at 605.
53
Id. at 604.
54
Id. at 603.
55
See McCabe, supra note 26, at 301.

1783

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

state’s highest court) upheld the adoption of a forty-five-year-old wife by
her fifty-eight-year-old husband.56 The primary purpose of the adoption
was to secure the wife’s entitlement to a trust established by her mother-inlaw, which went to the husband during his life with the remainder to his
heirs at law.57 If the husband died without any heirs, the trust would be
divided between two charities.58 The adoption made his wife his heir at law
and thus the beneficiary of the trust upon his death.59 The court upheld the
adoption and thus the inheritance since adult adoption was clearly lawful
and adopted children were included within the designation of an heir under
Kentucky law.60
Finally, another, though admittedly weaker, financial reason for adult
adoption is the potential for reduced inheritance taxes. In some states,
inheritance tax rates are lower for property transfers that flow to a lineal
heir as opposed to someone unrelated or less directly related to the decedent
in the disposition of an estate.61 In In re Adoption of Swanson, the Supreme
Court of Delaware acknowledged this benefit, stating that one reason for the
adult adoption at issue was to “obtain the reduced inheritance tax rate which
natural and adopted children enjoy under Delaware law.”62
C. Adult Adoption by Same-Sex Couples
Because of the numerous advantages of adult adoption, it is used by
same-sex couples seeking benefits denied to them because they are unable
to legally marry. Adult adoption by same-sex couples may be implemented
for a combination of reasons, such as recognizing family units, establishing
intestate succession, or ensuring the extension of benefits.63 While this
seems like a tempting tool for same-sex couples and may in fact be the best
available option for an individual couple, it also carries several
disadvantages.
1.

56

The benefits of marriage: A comparison to adult
adoption.—Marriage includes a multitude of benefits that are not

302 S.W.2d 594, 596, 600 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957).
Id. at 596.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 600.
60
Id. at 598–99.
61
See Turnipseed, supra note 2, at 105.
62
In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1096 (Del. 1993) (involving the adoption of a fiftyone-year-old man by his sixty-six-year-old companion). This benefit is no longer as significant a
motivation for adult adoption, however, since the large majority of states have done away with their
inheritance tax. See Turnipseed, supra note 2, at 105 n.59 (citing Taxes by State, RETIREMENT LIVING
INFO. CENTER (Jan. 2011), http://www.retirementliving.com/RLtaxes.html). Even Delaware, noted
above, has since replaced its inheritance tax with an estate tax that does not examine the relationship to
the receiving parties of the property. See id. (citing 71 Del. Laws 902 (1999)).
63
See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 3, at 679–88.
57
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otherwise available to unmarried couples.64 By denying gay and lesbian
couples the right to marry, federal and state legislatures block the primary
route to the couples’ recognition of those benefits.65 Though the definition
of family has broadened and become more flexible in today’s society,
courts, legislatures, and government decisionmakers have continued to
show reluctance toward recognizing same-sex marriage.66 In light of this
hesitation, adult adoption has become an imperfect alternative for many
same-sex couples.
Possibly the most significant benefit that marriage provides is the legal
and formal recognition of a family unit. As an expression of commitment,
marriage is said to promote the societal goal of family stability.67 In this
respect, adult adoption does a fair job of simulating the marital relationship
by formally and publically acknowledging a direct family tie between
adopter and adoptee.
Additionally, many beneficiary privileges are established within the
framework of familial status based on marriage or biological ties. Access to
insurance policies, employee benefits, and retirement funds may be equally
important to the same-sex couples that wish to marry as it is to the married
couples to whom the benefits apply.68 Worker’s compensation schemes
often function the same way, with benefits only provided to qualified
“dependents” of the employee.69 In this context, adult adoption creates the
family relationship that is generally needed to become a beneficiary, thus
conferring the same rights as would a marriage.70
Finally, same-sex couples use adult adoption largely to secure the
intestate succession created by marriage.71 Under intestacy laws, the estate
of a decedent, or at least a portion of that estate, first passes to the surviving
64

See Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same-Sex Couples, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 359, 359 (1995)
(referencing the “panoply of entitlements and privileges that come as part of the institution of
marriage”).
65
It is true that all unmarried couples are denied the benefits of the institution of marriage, but the
impact on same-sex couples is particularly severe because they are not afforded the option to enter into a
marital relationship. See Developments in the Law—Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1508, 1604 (1989) [hereinafter Sexual Orientation and the Law].
66
See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504–06 (1977) (broadening the legal definition
of family beyond the nuclear family to include one’s extended family); see also Sexual Orientation and
the Law, supra note 65, at 1604 (noting the changing modern family, often headed by a single parent or
by two working parents).
67
See Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 65, at 1607.
68
See Turnipseed, supra note 2, at 105–06.
69
See Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 65, at 1618–19.
70
Although in the insurance context a policyholder may designate whomever he wishes as a
beneficiary, the insurance company may require factual evidence of a close relationship between the
insured and the proposed beneficiary. See Fowler, supra note 3, at 682–83. Through adult adoption, the
couple can avoid or minimize the ability of other potential heirs to attack the designation of a
beneficiary on undue influence grounds. See id.
71
See id. at 679–80.
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spouse.72 For example, under UPC section 2-102, the entire intestate estate
passes to the surviving spouse if there is no surviving parent or descendant,
or if any descendants are also descendants of the surviving spouse.73 In any
other context, a minimum of $150,000 still transfers first to the surviving
spouse.74 By creating a legal relationship through adult adoption, same-sex
couples may be able to ensure similar intestacy rights.75
2.

The disadvantages of adult adoption for same-sex
couples.—Despite the benefits of adult adoption, same-sex couples
have been wary of using it as a legal tool.76 While it confers rights similar
to those that marriage creates, it also entails many disadvantages that do not
arise in the marital context. Probably the most widespread criticism of
adult adoption for same-sex couples is its irrevocability.77 If the intimate
relationship between the couple ends, there is no mechanism comparable to
divorce to sever the legal bond.78 Because the legal relationship remains,
even an attempt to disinherit the adoptee may prove futile since the adoptee
will have standing to contest the will.79 Additionally, the adoptee may
continue to qualify as a class member in gifts by third parties to the heirs of
the adoptive parent.80
The strong push to create a permanent family unit through adoption
also has the added repercussion of affecting the partners’ inheritance rights
beyond their immediate relationship. In most states, the adoptee loses his
right to inherit from his biological parents when the new parent-child
relationship is created via adoption.81 If the intimate relationship ends, the
adoptee cannot restore his right to inherit from his natural parents.82
72

See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 30, at 75–76.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 36–37 (Supp. 2011).
74
Id.
75
As the main thrust of this Comment, the intestacy succession laws surrounding adult adoption and
its implications for same-sex couples in particular will be discussed in more detail infra Part III.
76
See Gwendolyn L. Snodgrass, Note, Creating Family Without Marriage: The Advantages and
Disadvantages of Adult Adoption Among Gay and Lesbian Partners, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 75, 75
(1997).
77
See id. at 83 (identifying its irrevocability as adult adoption’s “most negative characteristic”).
78
See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 30, at 107.
79
See, e.g., Snodgrass, supra note 76, at 83–84; see also supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text
(discussing the effect of adult adoption on standing to contest a will).
80
This issue was highlighted by the famous case of billionaire tobacco heiress Doris Duke, who
adopted thirty-five-year-old Chandi Heffner. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 30, at 107–08. Doris
and Chandi later had a falling out, and Doris wished to exclude Chandi from taking as her heir. Id. at
107. Specifically, Doris’s father had established two trusts that named Doris’s children as remainders.
Id. Though Doris was explicit in her will that she did not intend for Chandi to be treated as her child,
Chandi sued and received a $60 million settlement from the trusts and $5 million from Doris’s estate.
Id. at 107–08.
81
See Fowler, supra note 3, at 681. In response to this, same-sex couples should consider which
partner stands to inherit the most and which partner is likely to outlive the other. Chase, supra note 64,
at 387–88. Additionally, couples should consider the fact that an adoptee can still inherit from his
73
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Socially, adult adoption may subject the parties to the scorn of friends
and family. Unlike marriage, outsiders may view the adoptive relationship
as undermining social roles and perverting the parent–child relationship.83
This can take a psychological toll on the partners both individually and as a
couple.84 Additionally, the imposition of a parent–child relationship may
have a psychological impact on the parties by destabilizing the idea that the
relationship is one based on equality, since it formally changes the positions
of the parties in relation to each other.85
Finally, sexually intimate partners who establish a parent–child
relationship through adult adoption run the risk of being prosecuted for
incest. Though it is uncertain how often this happens in practice, the incest
statutes of many states are broad enough to include sexual relations between
a parent and an adult adopted child.86 While incest statutes are narrowly
construed such that they will not act as a legal bar to the actual adoption of
one’s lover, the subsequent relationship that is established may open up the
couple to criminal prosecution.87 Such criminalization has been criticized
on constitutional grounds post-Lawrence v. Texas,88 but for now, the risk
remains a consideration of same-sex couples looking to legally recognize
their relationship.
Because of these drawbacks, couples have been cautious in their use of
adult adoption as a stand-in for marriage.89
However, with the
unavailability of same-sex marriage in almost all jurisdictions,90 adult
adoption is still a valid option to secure certain benefits that are otherwise
inaccessible. Given its continued use, it is helpful to next examine the law
surrounding the availability of adult adoption.

biological parents by will. Snodgrass, supra note 76, at 84. If one partner’s relatives are more
supportive of the relationship, it may be beneficial for that partner to sever the legally recognized
familial ties and instead establish his inheritance rights by will.
82
Snodgrass, supra note 76, at 84.
83
See id.
84
See id.
85
See Fowler, supra note 3, at 707.
86
Turnipseed, supra note 2, at 98. Currently, states are split as to whether the adoption of a lover
falls within the reach of incest statutes. See id. at 121–23 (noting that at least twenty-five states have
laws, either statutory or common law, that place the adoptive relationship between an adopted parent
and adult child within the reach of incest).
87
Snodgrass, supra note 76, at 85.
88
539 U.S. 558 (2003); see Turnipseed, supra note 2, at 132 (concluding that Lawrence’s protection
of personal sexual privacy should be extended to protect against criminalization of same-sex couples
who choose to adopt).
89
See Snodgrass, supra note 76, at 75.
90
See Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (July 14, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16430 (citing only seven states
and the District of Columbia as issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples).
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D. The Law Surrounding Adult Adoption
As noted previously, adoption in the United States exists purely as a
creature of statute.91 Most states allow one adult to adopt another, subject to
certain statutory requirements and limitations.92 In courts that grant adult
adoptions, most take the position that a court has a duty to recognize adult
adoptions if the statute allows it. Other courts, however, inject their own
interpretations into the statutes, reading in requirements and limitations that
they argue are necessary to remain consistent with public policy.93 This
section provides an overview of the relevant state statutory requirements. It
also addresses the actual adoption process and how adult adoption may
differ from minor adoption.
1. Statutory Restrictions.—Currently, several states have statutorily
defined restrictions or prohibitions on the adoption of adults.94 In many, the
restriction is an age requirement.95 In New Jersey, for example, adult
adoption is allowed with a minimum ten-year age gap,96 and in
Massachusetts, Nevada, and Connecticut, state statutes allow for adult
adoption as long as the adopted adult is younger than the adopter.97
In addition, several statutes make some form of qualification based on
the existing relationship between the parties, most commonly prohibiting
adult adoption between spouses or siblings.98 The Uniform Adoption Act
(UAA) states that “[a]n adult may adopt another adult . . . but an adult may
not adopt his or her spouse.”99 Other states require the existence of a certain
type of relationship before the parties can enter into an adult adoption.100 In
Arizona, an adult adoptee must be a “stepchild, niece, nephew, cousin or
91

See supra Part I.A.
See Turnipseed, supra note 2, at 107–08.
93
See McCabe, supra note 26, at 305–06.
94
See, e.g., K. M. Potraker, Annotation, Adoption of Adult, 21 A.L.R. 3d 1012 (1968).
95
See, e.g., id.
96
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:22-2 (West 2011). This requirement may be waived, however, if the court
determines that the adoption would be in the best interests of the adoptee. Id. Similarly, Puerto Rico
allows for the adoption of an adult as long as the adoptee is fourteen years younger than the adopter.
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 531(4) (2009).
97
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-734 (2011); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 1 (LexisNexis 2011); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 127.190 (2007).
98
See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 1 (allowing the adoption of a younger adult “unless such other
person is his or her wife or husband, or brother, sister, uncle or aunt, of the whole or half blood”);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-734 (using similar language to the Massachusetts statute).
99
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 5-101, 9 U.L.A. 113 (1994). While the UAA has only been adopted in
its entirety in Vermont, other states have adopted portions of the Act to supplement their existing
adoption statutes. See Carrie L. Wambaugh, Comment, Biology Is Important, but Does Not Necessarily
Always Constitute a “Family”: A Brief Survey of the Uniform Adoption Act, 32 AKRON L. REV. 791,
792 & n.8 (1999).
100
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-8101 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.02(B)(3) (West
2011).
92
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grandchild of the adopting person.”101 Similarly, Ohio allows for the
adoption of an adult primarily if the adoptee is disabled or mentally
retarded, or the adopter acted as stepparent or foster-caregiver to the
adoptee while she was a minor.102
2.

Judicial Considerations and the Process of Adopting an
Adult.—Once the parties have ensured compliance with any
relevant statutory requirements, the process of adopting an adult is usually
relatively simple. In fact, adopting an adult is often easier than adopting a
minor, since many of the concerns in a minor adoption are no longer
relevant.103 Some courts treat adult adoption as similar to a contractual
agreement and routinely grant petitions presented by two competent
adults.104 This is reflected in the UAA, which requires only the consent of
the adoptee and adoptive parent for an adult adoption.105 Generally, giving
notice to the biological parents and other blood relatives is not even
required.106 This is one notable way in which the adult adoption process is
more streamlined than that of minor adoption, which generally requires
some form of consent by the biological parents.107
Additionally, in minor adoptions the court traditionally looks to the
best interests of the adoptee.108 When the proposed adoption is between two
consenting adults, however, some courts refuse to substitute their own
judgment of the parties’ “best interests” for that of the consenting adults.109
Other courts choose to go beyond the plain language of the statute.
Some consider the underlying motivation of the parties, looking to whether
the purpose of the adoption is insincere, criminal, or fraudulent.110 Courts
often recognize that an adult adoption for inheritance purposes is not itself
fraudulent.111 Other courts look to the public policy implications of granting

101

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-8101. The provision also allows for adoption by a foster parent as
long as the adoptee was placed in the adopter’s custody as a juvenile and the parties have maintained a
familial relationship for at least five years. Id.
102
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.02(B).
103
See McCabe, supra note 26, at 304.
104
See Fowler, supra note 3, at 692. In such cases, the only finding by the court is whether there is
voluntary and mutual consent. See id.
105
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 5-103, 9 U.L.A. 114 (1994). The provision requires the parties’ consent
to be in writing, and it must acknowledge their understanding of the consequences of the adoption,
specifically as it relates to “inheritance, property, or support.” Id.
106
See Turnipseed, supra note 2, at 111.
107
See McCabe, supra note 26, at 304; see also § 2-401, 9 U.L.A. 49–50 (requiring the consent of
the child’s biological mother and the presumed father, or the minor’s guardian or current adoptive
parent).
108
McCabe, supra note 26, at 304.
109
Fowler, supra note 3, at 694.
110
See McCabe, supra note 26, at 305.
111
See Potraker, supra note 94, § 8.
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adult adoptions.112 Notably, New York courts have relied on public policy
grounds to deny adult adoptions to homosexual couples.113 According to the
state’s highest court, allowing the adoption of one’s lover would be “wholly
inconsistent with the underlying public policy of providing a parent-child
relationship,”114 and “the Legislature could not have intended that the statute
be employed ‘to arrive at an unreasonable or absurd result.’”115
Overall, the process of adopting an adult and the limitations imposed
by the legislature and judiciary vary widely from state to state.116 The
majority of states do, however, allow some form of adult adoption,117 which
raises the issue of how such relationships should be treated in those states.
The next section addresses the treatment of adult adoptees under the UPC
provisions on intestate succession and class gifts and assesses the positive
and negative attributes of the Code’s approach.
II. ADULT ADOPTION, INTESTATE SUCCESSION, AND CLASS GIFTS
As noted previously, adult adoption is often undertaken to secure the
adoptee’s inheritance rights.118 This arises in the context of intestate
succession, where the adoptee may stand to inherit from or through the
adoptive parent under the intestacy laws adopted by the state. Additionally,
inheritance issues arise in relation to trust cases and class gifts, where the
established legal relationship may result in the inclusion of the adoptee in
such class designations as “heirs” and “descendants.”119 The UPC, which
seeks to establish a model for the states, has weighed in on the treatment of
adult adoptees in both contexts. This section examines the relevant UPC
provisions, compares them with current state statutes, and assesses whether
they properly promote the principles of estate law and are consistent with
sound public policy for the states.
A. The Uniform Probate Code
1. UPC Section 2-115.—In general, the UPC treats adopted children
as natural children for intestacy purposes. This is explained in Article II of
the UPC, which includes the Code’s detailed provisions regarding intestacy,

112

See McCabe, supra note 26, at 305–06.
See In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424, 425–27 (N.Y. 1984).
114
Id. at 425.
115
Id. at 427 (quoting Williams v. Williams, 246 N.E.2d 333, 337 (N.Y. 1969)).
116
See supra notes 94–115 and accompanying text (discussing the various statutory restrictions and
judicial interpretations across the states).
117
See Turnipseed, supra note 2, at 107–08; see also Adult Adoption Laws, ADOPTING.ORG,
http://www.adopting.org/adoptions/adopting-an-adult-state-laws.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2011)
(providing state-by-state summaries of adult adoption statutes).
118
See supra Part I.B.
119
See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 30, at 106.
113
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wills, and donative transfers.120 Part 1 of Article II establishes the basic
pattern of intestate succession to be applied in cases where there is no
individualized estate plan.121 In section 2-118, the Code provides that a
“parent-child relationship exists between an adoptee and the adoptee’s
adoptive parent or parents.”122 The Code proceeds to define “adoptee” in
section 2-115 as meaning “an individual who is adopted.”123
The drafters explain in the comments to section 2-115 that “‘adoptee’
is not limited to an individual who is adopted as a minor but includes an
individual who is adopted as an adult.”124 This statement explicitly resolves
the issue posed by adult adoptees, clarifying that they are to be treated in
the same vein as natural children for purposes of intestacy. As section
2-116 states, if a parent–child relationship exists, “the parent is a parent of
the child and the child is a child of the parent for the purpose of intestate
succession.”125 This means that, under the UPC, an adult adoptee may
inherit directly as the heir of the adoptive parent and may also inherit
through the adoptive parent as a descendant by representation.
2. UPC Section 2-705.—The UPC’s general policy that adopted
children are to be treated as the natural children of the adoptive parent is
reflected in its treatment of class gifts. In setting out the rules of
construction to be applied to class gifts in wills and other governing
instruments, section 2-705 specifically states that “‘[a]doptee’ has the
meaning set forth in Section 2-115.”126 As discussed above, section 2-115
defines adoptee as “an individual who is adopted.”127 Section 2-705 goes on
to explain that “[a] class gift that uses a term of relationship to identify the
class members includes . . . an adoptee . . . in accordance with the rules for
intestate succession regarding parent-child relationships.”128 Thus, “except
as otherwise provided in subsections (e) and (f),” an adoptee is to be
included in any class that is founded on a parent–child relationship with the
adoptive parent.129

120

UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-102 to -122 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 36–66 (Supp. 2011).
Id. at Art. II, pt. 1, general cmt., 8 U.L.A. 34–35 (stating that the intestate succession established
under Part 1 “was designed to provide suitable rules for the person of modest means who relies on the
estate plan provided by law”).
122
Id. § 2-118(a), 8 U.L.A. 53.
123
Id. § 2-115(1), 8 U.L.A. 50.
124
Id. § 2-115 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 51–52 (emphasis added).
125
Id. § 2-116, 8 U.L.A. 52.
126
Id. § 2-705(a)(1), 8 U.L.A. 141.
127
Id. § 2-115(1), 8 U.L.A. 50.
128
Id. § 2-705(b), 8 U.L.A. 141.
129
Id. Subsection (e), which is outside the scope of this Comment, addresses inheritance as a child
of a genetic parent when the genetic parent or his relatives did not function as a parent. Id. § 2-705(e), 8
U.L.A. 141.
121

1791

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

However, the UPC takes a distinctly different approach to its treatment
of adult adoptees in its class gift provisions than it does in the intestacy
context. As provided under subsection (f) under the heading “Transferor
Not Adoptive Parent”:
In construing a dispositive provision of a transferor who is not the adoptive
parent, an adoptee is not considered the child of the adoptive parent unless:
(1) the adoption took place before the adoptee reached [eighteen] years of
age;
(2) the adoptive parent was the adoptee’s stepparent or foster parent; or
(3) the adoptive parent functioned as a parent of the adoptee before the
adoptee reached [eighteen] years of age.130

This means that, while an adult adoptee is freely included in a class gift
from her adoptive parent, she is not included in the same class for purposes
of transfers from persons other than the adoptive parent unless a bona fide
parent-child relationship exists.
To illustrate, suppose that A adopts X as an adult, and A is not X’s
stepparent or foster parent and did not function as X’s parent while X was a
minor. If A dies testate, leaving his estate “to my children,” X takes a share
in the estate since the transferor is the adoptive parent. However, if a third
party, such as A’s parent, dies and leaves his estate “to A’s children,” X is
not entitled to share in the estate as part of that class. Thus, an adult
adoptee is included in class gifts when transferred from the adopting parent
but not from a third party.
B. State Statutes
Some state legislation addresses intestacy and class gift issues within
state adoption laws, specifically prohibiting adult adoptions motivated by
inheritance objectives.131 Other states distinguish between adult and minor
adoptees under state intestacy and class gift laws, as does the UPC.132
However, a majority of states leave these questions open to the courts’
interpretation by not differentiating between adult and minor adoptees133
and providing no guidance on the interpretation of class gift language.
In situations where the statute fails to distinguish between adult and
minor adoptees, courts generally presume that adult adoptees are intended
to be treated in the same respect as minor adoptees. Such an interpretation
130

Id. § 2-705(f), 8 U.L.A. 141–42.
See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-6 cmt. (2011) (“Adult adoptions for inheritance purposes provided for
in . . . the Alabama Code [were] repealed.”). The merits of such an approach are assessed in more detail
infra Part III.B.
132
See IND. CODE § 29-1-6-1(d) (2011).
133
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 101(1) (2011) (defining “[c]hild” as “any individual entitled to
take as a child under this title by intestate succession from the parent”).
131
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was adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Chichester v. Wilmington
Trust Co., where the court addressed whether two adult adoptees could
inherit through their adoptive parent by right of representation.134 The
majority referenced the portion of the adoption statute relating specifically
to adult adoption, which stated that “all the duties, rights, privileges and
obligations recognized by law between parent and child shall exist between
the petitioner . . . and the person . . . adopted, as fully and to all intents and
purposes as if such person . . . were the lawful and natural offspring or issue
of the petitioner.”135 The court then applied this provision to the broad
language in the probate code and held that the adult adoptees were included
as beneficiaries of a trust as “issue” of their adoptive parent’s mother.136
With regard to class gifts, some states have provisions similar to those
of the UPC.137 In Indiana, for example, the court distinguishes between
minor and adult adoptees, treating a minor adoptee as the natural child of
the adoptive parent for all intents and purposes related to class gifts.138 With
regard to adult adoptees, however, the statute states: “Any person adopted
after the person’s twenty-first birthday by the testator shall be considered
the child of the testator, but no other person shall be entitled to establish
relationship to the testator through such child.”139
C. Decedent’s Intent and Other Policy Considerations
When analyzing the merits of these statutes it is important to focus on
both the interests of the property owner and the interests of society as a
whole.140 While it is true that, in practice, intestacy laws and rules of
construction will not work equally well for each decedent, it should be the
legislature’s objective to adopt a framework that is as consistent as possible
with both the decedent’s intent and the relevant public policy objectives.141
1. Interests of the Property Owner.—When someone dies without a
will, one of the fundamental objectives is to dispose of the estate in the
manner most likely to reflect the decedent’s wishes.142 This is done by
estimating what the average decedent in the situation would have
134

377 A.2d 11, 12 (Del. 1977).
Id. at 13 n.1 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 954).
136
Id. at 14.
137
See IND. CODE § 29-1-6-1(d).
138
Id. (“In construing a will making a devise to a person or persons described by relationship to the
testator or to another, any person adopted prior to the person’s twenty-first birthday before the death of
the testator shall be considered the child of the adopting parent . . . .”).
139
Id.
140
See Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 7
(2000).
141
See id. at 1–2.
142
See Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal Revocation: Manifestations of Probate’s
Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 411, 419 (2009).
135
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intended.143 In every state, the law assumes that the decedent’s probable
intent was to transfer property to the most proximate members of her
family.144
The preferential treatment of relatives in intestacy statutes stems in part
from the strong tendency of testators to leave their estates to spouses and
lineal descendants, providing evidence of the average decedent’s intent.145
Additionally, there is a commonly held expectation that if one dies intestate,
his property transfers to his next of kin.146 Roughly half the population dies
without a will,147 which may be due at least in part to the assumption that
their estate will transfer to proximate family members without the need for
costly legal action.148 The goal of intestacy law is to meet this
expectation.149
When someone dies with a will, the goal remains the same: to give
effect to the decedent’s intent.150 But unlike in intestacy situations, there is
actual written evidence of the testator’s wishes. This implicates the
fundamental estate law principle of testamentary freedom, which is the
belief that the testator has the right to dispose of her property as she
wishes.151 The task then becomes one of construction: to interpret the
instrument in the manner that most effectively protects this liberty and
provides the intended interpretation of the language used. This issue arises
with class gifts, where the testator often uses such terms as “children,”
“issue,” or “heirs.” In these cases, the court is presented with the task of
determining whether the testator intended to include the relevant individual
in that gift.
2. Interests of Society.—At the same time, it is important to look at
the policy considerations implicated by adult adoptions, which can
sometimes lie in tension with the likely intent of the donor.152 Though the

143

Rein, supra note 3, at 732.
See Glover, supra note 142, at 419.
145
See id. (noting that scholarly surveys of probate records confirm that the “vast majority of
testators distribute their estates within the family”).
146
See id. at 420–21.
147
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 30, at 71.
148
Cf. Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and
Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 323–24 (arguing in
support of the right not to execute a will so that one’s estate passes to his family in accordance with
decedent intent).
149
See Glover, supra note 142, at 419 (“The primary goal of intestacy is to distribute the estate in
accordance with the decedent’s probable wishes; an intent the law assumes is to direct assets to
surviving family members.”).
150
See Rein, supra note 3, at 731–32.
151
See Glover, supra note 142, at 422.
152
See Rein, supra note 3, at 732–33.
144
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power of testation does have legal limitations,153 the principle of
testamentary freedom suggests that a clear indication of decedent intent
generally supersedes any concern over reflecting community attitudes and
meeting public expectations.154 However, in cases of intestacy, where there
is no written will indicating the decedent’s wishes, and class gifts, where
intent is often ambiguous, these concerns should play a larger role.
One of the primary societal goals of estate law is to support and
encourage healthy family units.155 Beyond just promoting succession within
the family, estate law seeks to strengthen bonds and limit familial
disputes.156 By favoring succession within the family, it ensures that the
decedent’s dependents are provided for and gives incentive to care for and
maintain relationships with adult family members.157
Succession laws also have the ability to provide for the well-being of
society as a whole. The broader social considerations for legislatures to
keep in mind include promoting social and legal stability, encouraging ease
of administration, maintaining respect for the system, and preventing
waste.158 Presumably, providing constancy within the law secures public
expectations and encourages trust in the system.
This is not to say that the law should not be responsive to changes in
society, but rather that it should have clear parameters and be consistently
applied. For this reason, there is a societal interest in preventing the use of
legal strategy to avoid and manipulate the rationales behind our laws. Not
only does such manipulation cut against the interests that the legislature is
trying to promote, but it may serve to undermine the credibility of the
system as a whole. For example, parties using adult adoption solely for
inheritance purposes are sometimes acting specifically to circumvent the
decedent’s intent. Yet, respecting the decedent’s intent is a fundamental
tenet of estate law.159 Allowing inheritance in these cases disappoints public
expectations and leads to inconsistency within the system.160

153

John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 n.8
(1975) (noting such limitations as taxation, forced share or other family protection legislation, and the
rule against perpetuities).
154
See id. at 491; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 & cmts. a–c (2003) (“The donor’s intention is given effect to the maximum extent
allowed by law . . . . American law does not grant courts any general authority to question the wisdom,
fairness, or reasonableness of the donor’s decisions about how to allocate his or her property.”).
155
See Gary, supra note 140, at 10.
156
See id.
157
See id. at 11–12.
158
See John T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497, 513–
16 (1977).
159
See Gary, supra note 140, at 7–8.
160
The court in Cross v. Cross endorsed this view, stating that to allow “[t]he adoption of an adult
solely for the purpose of making him an heir of an ancestor under the terms of a testamentary instrument
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D. Application: Intestate Succession and Class Gifts
Applying these considerations to the adoption context, it is now
generally accepted that adoptive children should be treated as natural
children for purposes of intestate succession and class gifts.161 The
requirement of a blood connection, historically a prerequisite for a parent–
child relationship in the intestacy and testacy context, has been largely
disavowed as an outdated and underinclusive principle of estate law.162 This
promotes the public policies in favor of adoption, which legally recognizes
existing family bonds and promotes permanency within family units.
For inheritance purposes, the most common practice is to fully
incorporate the child into the adopting family.163 Not all states recognize
the ability of an adopted child to inherit through the adoptive parent, though
it has been argued that this is inconsistent with the societal policy of
promoting the best interests of the adoptee by fully recognizing him as a
family member.164 This policy, that an adopted child should be recognized
as a full member of the adoptive family, supports the inclusion of all
adoptees in intestacy statutes. It is from this starting point that this
Comment next considers decedent intent and societal interests in the
treatment of adult adoptees under these provisions.
1. Intestate Succession.—State laws customarily allow an adult
adoptee to inherit directly from an adoptive parent if that parent dies
intestate.165 This practice is also permissible under UPC section 2-116,
given the definition of adoptee as including an adult adoptee under section

known and in existence at the time of the adoption is an act of subterfuge.” 532 N.E.2d 486, 488–89
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
161
Most jurisdictions recognize full inheritance rights between the adoptee and the adoptive family.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5(2) & cmt. d (1999)
(“Most intestacy statutes, including the Original and Revised UPC, treat an adopted child as a full
member of the child’s adoptive family.”). In terms of class gifts, adoptees are generally included in
classes for gifts coming directly from the adoptive parent. Rein, supra note 3, at 733. A few courts
have departed from this, but only in the context of avoiding dual inheritance. Id. When the donative
instrument is executed by a third party (not the adoptee or adoptive parent), the courts previously
applied the “stranger-to-the-adoption” rule, which served as a presumptive bar from including adopted
children. Id. Today, however, courts have replaced this rule with a presumption that adoption includes
the adoptee in the class unless the donor expressly excludes him. Id. at 735.
162
See Lee-ford Tritt, Sperms and Estates: An Unadulterated Functionally Based Approach to
Parent-Child Property Succession, 62 SMU L. REV. 367, 368–69 (2009).
163
See Gary, supra note 140, at 28.
164
See Rein, supra note 3, at 720–22. In South Dakota, for example, the state statute provides:
“After adoption the [child and person adopting] shall sustain towards each other the legal relation of
parent and child and have all the rights and be subject to all the duties of that relation.” S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 25-6-16 (2011). State courts have interpreted this language to mean that “[t]he contractual
nature of adoption does not extend beyond the adoptive parents and the child.” In re Estate of Edwards,
273 N.W.2d 118, 120 (S.D. 1978).
165
See Rein, supra note 3, at 755.
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2-115.166 Historically, creating one’s own heir through adoption has almost
always been accepted and the result is considered very clearly within the
contemplation of the decedent.167 Though it has been argued that there is a
tension between allowing this sort of designative freedom and promoting
the societal interest in familial succession,168 the strong policies in favor of
property rights and testamentary freedom overwhelmingly suggest that the
decedent’s intent should be respected in this context.
As discussed supra Part II.A.1, UPC sections 2-115 and 2-116 also
place no limitations on an adult adoptee’s right to inherit through his
adoptive parent.169 Whether this ability to inherit as a descendant by
representation is consistent with the decedent’s intent is not nearly as clear
as it is for transfers from the adoptive parent. Unlike minor adoptions, the
theoretical full integration of the adoptee into the adopting family is less
likely to reflect reality, especially in cases where the relationship is not truly
one of parent to child.
There is a stronger probability in adult adoptions, as compared to
minor adoptions, that relatives will not even be aware of the legal
relationship, and, even if they are, they will presumably be less likely to
consider the adoptee to be their grandson or niece or great-granddaughter.
This is due in large part to the parties and motivations involved in adult
adoptions, and the relative ease with which adult adoptions are obtained.170
For example, with a homosexual couple, it is doubtful that the adopting
partner’s parents would consider their child’s same-sex partner as their
grandson. This would be inconsistent with general conceptions of familial
roles, diminishing the likelihood that there would be the expectation that
their estate would transfer to him in his capacity as a grandchild.
From an efficiency and policy perspective, disallowing the inheritance
by adult adoptees through their adoptive parents would provide a bright-line
rule that is simple to administer and likely to reflect the decedent’s intent.
Some argue that in intestacy cases the adoption is likely to occur during the
decedent’s lifetime, providing him with the opportunity to draft a will
excluding the adoptee if he so desires.171 However if there is no
requirement that the relatives be notified, a deceased relative of the adopter
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REV. 971, 988 (1965).
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may not even be aware of the adoption.172 Setting a default rule prohibiting
such inheritance will provide the relatives that do know about the adoption
the opportunity to change their wills to include the adoptee if they so desire.
It is true, however, that some adult adoptions are undertaken to
recognize a parent–child relationship that has existed since the adoptee was
a minor.173 In these cases, the policies that underlie the treatment of minor
adoptees as natural children are also present. Because of this, the
legislature should provide an exception for such adult adoptees, allowing
their inheritance as full-fledged members of the family.174
The above analysis of public policy and decedent intent suggests that
change is necessary both in section 2-115 of the UPC, which treats adopted
children as natural children for intestacy purposes, and in those state
statutes that are left open to interpretation regarding adult adoptees
specifically. As stated previously, many state courts that are given such
discretion presume that the legislature’s intention was to treat minor and
adult adoptees in the same manner.175 Since there are strong policy reasons
for allowing minor adoptees to inherit through their adoptive parents that do
not exist for all adult adoptees, the legislature should be clear about
distinguishing between minors and adults.
2. Class Gifts.—While section 2-115 may lead to unfavorable results,
the UPC more effectively addresses the specific concerns that arise with
adult adoptions in its class gift provision, section 2-705.176 In analyzing the
decedent’s intent, the same issues surface as in the intestacy context. The
only difference is that the donor has provided a written instrument that
might give some indication of her intention. When the donor’s intent is
clear, it should be fully respected.177 However, such circumstances are
rare.178
When the gift is directly from the adoptive parent, it is evident that the
donor intended to include the adult adoptee in the class.179 However, when
the decedent is a third party, it is likely that the decedent was not even
aware of the adoption. This is true both because of the lack of noticerequirements and because many of these cases arise with respect to bequests
172

Rein, supra note 3, at 756.
See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.
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See supra Part II.B.
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See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 141–42 (Supp. 2011).
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173

1798

105:1777 (2011)

Adult Adoption

distributed long after the donor has died.180 In fact, adult adoption may not
have been legalized at the time the instrument was executed.181 Because
many adult adoptions are used to solidify relationships other than ones that
are parent–child in nature, it is probable that the testator did not anticipate
such a relation to be included as a child or an heir when he executed the
instrument.
The UPC properly addresses these issues by refusing to consider the
adult adoptee as a child of the adoptive parent in interpreting class gifts
from parties other than the adoptive parent.182 In addition to adequately
deducing the decedent’s intent, section 2-705 promotes the societal interest
in maintaining legal and social stability and in protecting the credibility of
the statutory scheme. It also prevents any attempts to evade testamentary
freedom, which is a fundamental tenet of estate law.
Additionally, parties may use adoption to gain benefits beyond those
intended for their substantive relationship, such as when a husband adopts
his wife.183 State legislatures make a deliberate decision to confer certain
benefits on specific types of relationships after considering the decedent’s
probable intent and the policy considerations discussed above.184 A
legislature’s statutory scheme with respect to these relationships should not
be undermined by the use of adoption in a way that frustrates that plan.
This issue may also arise in the same-sex-couple context, with the growing
(albeit slowly) availability of same-sex marriage.185 Legislatures should
avoid providing an incentive for couples to choose adoption over marriage
by legalizing same-sex marriage and refusing to recognize benefits of an
adult adoption that exceed those provided by marriage in cases where
marriage more accurately embodies the relationship. By prohibiting
inclusion in class gifts, the UPC prevents adoption from being used as a
manipulative tool.
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However, as was true in the intestacy context, there are some adult
adoptions that serve to recognize true parent–child relationships.186 In those
situations, public policy tends to support inclusion of the adoptee in the
class gift as the natural child of the adoptive parent. The UPC accounts for
these cases by allowing the adult adoptee to be included in the gift when the
adoptive parent is a stepparent, foster parent, or functioned as a parent
before the adoptee turned eighteen years old.187
This analysis not only supports the UPC approach, but also highlights
the flaws in the common approach of states to give full discretion to the
court to interpret the language of the will or dispositive instrument. As in
the intestacy context, courts are likely to interpret the lack of distinction
provided by the legislature as an indication that all adoptees should be
treated alike. So instead of drawing a line between minors and adults,
courts often draw distinctions on other improper grounds.
Courts commonly attempt to determine the testator’s intent by
distinguishing between those terms that are considered to have a legal
connotation and those that are considered to have a bloodline connotation.188
This arbitrary wordplay undermines the policy of treating even minor
adoptees as natural children, since presumably they could also be denied
inclusion in a class on the same grounds. Additionally, it fails to consider
the time that has lapsed since the document was executed and the precision
with which the language was used, which may indicate that the connotation
of the term was not considered by the decedent.189 Overall, it fails to
provide the specific guidance necessary to ensure consistent application and
can leave future testators uncertain about the implications of drafting legal
instruments. For these reasons, UPC section 2-705 more sufficiently
reflects the decedent’s likely intent and sound public policy.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the above analysis, it is clear that states should amend their
statutes in order to most effectively comply with the decedent’s intent and
to promote sound public policy. At the same time, this narrow approach
may cut off protection of valuable rights that might not otherwise be
available to the parties involved. This section sets forth a proposal for state
intestacy and class gift provisions that more effectively embodies the goals
of probate law and public policy than the current UPC provisions and
explains why the approach should be adopted over another proposed
186
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strategy of handling these issues at the adoption phase. Additionally, this
section provides an alternative to adult adoption for preserving rights that
might otherwise be denied.
A. Proposed Statutory Provisions
With respect to class gifts, UPC section 2-705 properly addresses the
relevant policy considerations while respecting the donor’s intent. State
legislators should look to the UPC when drafting their class gift provisions
to specifically account for adult adoptees when the transfer is not from the
adoptive parent.
In the intestacy context however, the UPC takes an overly broad
approach. Instead of adopting the UPC intestacy scheme verbatim, states
should adopt the approach of section 2-705(f).190 This would allow the
adult adoptee to inherit from the adoptive parent, but would limit the
opportunity for the adoptee to inherit through the adoptive parent. It would
take into account those circumstances in which a parent–child relationship
exists, allowing inheritance in those cases. As discussed above, the relevant
policy considerations and problems associated with decedent intent are
nearly identical in both the class gift and intestacy contexts. Adult adoptees
should therefore be treated the same under both provisions.
If adult adoptees are treated according to UPC section 2-705 for both
class gifts and intestacy, the only potential obstacle is that the judiciary
must address whether the adoptive parent “functioned as a parent.”191 One
could argue that this is too subjective a determination to be made in the
probate context and that it would create too large an administrative burden.
However, the judiciary has proved itself equipped to make such
determinations both in the adoption and inheritance contexts.192 In any
event, the judiciary should take a narrow approach when utilizing section 2705(f)(3) and should limit its application to circumstances in which the
parental functions of the adoptive parent are so visible that the judiciary’s
Only such a clear parent–child
investigative role is negligible.193
190
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relationship would presumably affect the expectations of outside parties,
specifically those parties who would be implicated in the intestacy and class
gift contexts. Thus, a narrow view is likely more consistent with decedent
intent.
B. The Adoption Phase
Some argue that inheritance considerations should be addressed in the
adoption-granting phase by requiring the court to consider the petitioners’
motivation for adoption and deny those adoptions whose primary purpose is
to include the adoptee as a trust beneficiary.194 However, these estatespecific issues surrounding adult adoption can more efficiently be resolved
by clear and comprehensive intestacy and class gift statutes, such as the
provisions suggested above. This allows the court to avoid making a
subjective evaluation of adoptive intent and prevents the invasiveness
involved in determining the nature of such a relationship.195
Particularly with regard to same-sex couples, the motivation behind an
adult adoption will likely be multifaceted.196 It is, however, not in society’s
best interest to withhold these benefits solely because an inheritance or
class gift objective is included. Instead, adult adoptions should be widely
granted to ensure that these benefits remain available.197 By barring the
inclusion in class gifts and intestate succession for such adoptions once
granted, the proposed provisions will force the parties to weigh their
motivations and drop the petition altogether if the sole purpose is to obtain
an unintended right that would violate the principles of estate law.
While same-sex marriage may be gaining momentum,198 until it is fully
adopted there is a strong public policy interest in maintaining a mechanism
by which gay and lesbian couples can reap at least some of the matrimonial
advantages. The relationship between the couple is similar to that of
spouses, and it can be presumed that their intent with regard to their
194

See McCabe, supra note 26, at 318.
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benefits and rights toward each other follows the same pattern as married
couples. For those benefits that are used as substitutes for a will (e.g., life
insurance, pensions, etc.), decedent intent should remain a priority. If the
couples have a way to legally enforce their relationships, it will ease
administration and reduce the number of disputes among relatives that no
longer have standing to challenge any will or will-like instruments.
Additionally, providing access to health insurance, worker’s compensation,
and other employee benefits will serve society as a whole by providing for
dependent individuals that do not otherwise receive spousal support.
C. An Alternative: Reciprocal Beneficiaries
While there is a strong societal interest in allowing adult adoption,
there are many drawbacks for the parties involved.199 However, without
other options, same-sex couples may feel obligated to resort to adult
adoption to block the possibility of collateral attack on their wills and to
secure the transfer of one partner’s estate to the other. Where same-sex
marriage is legalized, adult adoption is unnecessary to preserve inheritance
rights because the parties are treated as spouses under state law.200
Additionally, in states where alternative relationships are recognized, such
as civil unions or domestic partnerships, the disadvantages of adult adoption
can be avoided if the legislature amends its probate statutes to either include
parties to such a relationship under the definition of “spouse” or to at least
list them as receiving spousal rights.201 This coincides with those states’
policies in favor of conferring spousal-type benefits without full inclusion
in the marital institution.
However, in states that do not recognize same-sex marriages, civil
unions, or domestic partnerships, homosexual couples may feel forced into
adult adoption as the only way to block their wills from collateral attack.
This is also true in adult adoptions outside of the same-sex-couple context,
where inheritance may be a driving force. One alternative is to adopt a
system of reciprocal beneficiaries, which allows two adults to designate
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each other as beneficiaries not only for estate purposes, but also for access
to other rights and benefits similar to marriage.
Hawaii, by adopting the Hawaii Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act in 1997,
serves as an example of such an approach.202 To register under the statute,
parties sign a “declaration of reciprocal beneficiary relationship,” which
must be notarized and filed with the Director of Health.203 Hawaii has
adopted the UPC, and the amount that the beneficiary receives is
determined in the same manner as the amount that a spouse receives.204
Additionally, the designation is revocable; revocation triggers the same
legal effects as divorce.205 Through this process, the parties receive the
same intestacy and class gift benefits that marriage provides, without the
potential stigma of adult adoption.206 Additionally, the approach remedies
what is arguably the largest drawback of adult adoption—its irrevocability.
It also ensures that inheritance rights from each party’s natural families are
not severed, decreasing the problems of notice that arise with adult
adoption.207
Even in states that have decided not to recognize same-sex unions, a
reciprocal beneficiary system may not violate public policy nor be against
public sentiment. The system does not distinguish between the sexes of the
parties and does not include the same connotation as a marriage or civil
union. Hawaii itself has presented a strong opposition to gay marriage,
passing a constitutional amendment in 1998 against the practice, yet its
citizens have proved much more accepting of the reciprocal beneficiary
system.208 One influential survey conducted in 1998 found that, while
general sentiment was against gay marriage, “a substantial majority of the
respondents . . . preferred the partner to take a share of the decedent’s
estate,” and respondents “consistently preferred same-sex and opposite-sex
committed couples be treated the same under the inheritance laws.”209 This
shows that opposition to gay marriage can be compatible with recognizing
certain rights for same-sex couples.
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On the other side of the debate, gay-rights activists argue that a
reciprocal beneficiary system does not go far enough.210 While this may be
true, a reciprocal beneficiary scheme may be the only viable option in a
state like Hawaii where a constitutional amendment has been passed.211
Even in states that have not taken such drastic measures, a register for
reciprocal beneficiaries may be a step in the right direction by giving voters
an opportunity to adjust to and accept the legal recognition of relationships
between same-sex couples.212
CONCLUSION
Adult adoption is a widely used tool between both same-sex and
opposite-sex couples. While various motivations may underlie an adult
adoption, it inevitably has implications for intestate succession and class
gifts. The UPC has taken the first step of treating adult adoptees differently
in these contexts, but it must go one step further by eliminating the ability
of adult adoptees to inherit through their adoptive parents.
This is, of course, not to say that the benefits of adult adoption should
be outright denied. Instead, legislatures should grant adult adoptions
broadly while clearly and explicitly addressing the rights that they provide
under the state intestacy and class gift laws. Additionally, until same-sex
relationships are more widely recognized, legislatures should, at a
minimum, consider the alternative of recognizing self-designated reciprocal
beneficiaries to ensure the protection of these benefits.
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